Some of my colleagues are infatuated with Nietzsche, and judging by this book it's easy to understand why. In places it sounds considerably poststructural (I work in a literature department). It's about complexity ('our body is, after all, only a society constructed out of many souls', section 19), determinism and power-relations.

1. Nietzsche Par Dela Le Bien Et Le Mal Ebook Online
2. Nietzsche Par Dela Le Bien Et Le Mal Ebook Download

Nietzsche considers language a constituating force (20), tightly linked to experience (268). He undertakes a typology of value systems (186), meaning to expose and to undermine them. He subordinates truth to interest and he questions the reality of oppositions: 'we can doubt whether opposites even exist' (2). This was funny and familiar. But gradually I grew irritated, because of what seemed a continuous promotion of arrogance and rudenes.

Please stop bullying supposedly 'ill' and 'degenerated' people, i thought. To make matters worse, he debunked Madame de Stael (233). I'm a fan of hers. But then my opinion swung again. He deals with the downsides of intellectual distance (chapter 6) in an intriguing way. In chapter 8 he makes broad sweeping statements about european culture, that are, if not really convincing, still interesting. Then, in the concluding chapter, he zooms in on his favorite subject, the 'noble' person.

Surprisingly this figure now loses its arrogant looks and adopts an almost tragic countenance, prone to self-destruction and loneliness (269-284). The writing here is very serious and passionate, and results in an embrace of Dionysos, 'that great ambiguity and tempter god' (295). WORK IS IN FRENCH This book is a reproduction of a work published before 1920 and is part of a collection of books reprinted and edited by Hachette Livre, in the framework of a partnership with the National Library of France, providing the opportunity to access old and often rare books from the BnF's heritage funds.

Par dela le bien et le mal / Frederic Nietzsche; traduit par L. Weiscopf et G. Art; et edite par Henri AlbertDate de l'edition originale: 1898'Titre original: Jenseits von Gut und Bose'Ce livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920. Some of my colleagues are infatuated with Nietzsche, and judging by this book it's easy to understand why. In places it sounds considerably poststructural (I work in a literature department).

It's about complexity ('our body is, after all, only a society constructed out of many souls', section 19), determinism and power-relations. Nietzsche considers language a constituating force (20), tightly linked to experience (268). He undertakes a typology of value systems (186), meaning to expose and to undermine them. He subordinates truth to interest and he questions the reality of oppositions: 'we can doubt whether opposites even exist' (2). This was funny and familiar. But gradually I grew irritated, because of what seemed a continuous promotion of arrogance and rudenes. Please stop bullying supposedly 'ill' and 'degenerated' people, i thought.

To make matters worse, he debunked Madame de Stael (233). I'm a fan of hers. But then my opinion swung again.

He deals with the downsides of intellectual distance (chapter 6) in an intriguing way. In chapter 8 he makes broad sweeping statements about european culture, that are, if not really convincing, still interesting. Then, in the concluding chapter, he zooms in on his favorite subject, the 'noble' person. Surprisingly this figure now loses its arrogant looks and adopts an almost tragic countenance, prone to self-destruction and loneliness (269-284). The writing here is very serious and passionate, and results in an embrace of Dionysos, 'that great ambiguity and tempter god' (295). When writing about relation between neurosis and practices of solitude, fasting, sexual abstinence, Nietzsche writes: 'This latter doubt is justified by the fact that one of the most regular symptoms among savage as well as among civilized peoples is the most sudden and excessive sensuality, which then with equal suddenness transforms into penitential paroxysms, world-renunciation, and will-renunciation, both symptoms perhaps explainable as disguised epilepsy?

But nowhere is it MORE obligatory to put aside explanations around no other type has there grown such a mass of absurdity and superstition, no other type seems to have been more interesting to men and even to philosophers - perhaps it is time to become just a little indifferent here, to learn caution, or, better still, to look AWAY, TO GO AWAY -' (pages 33-34) After reading above words, decided to go away from this book. Some of my colleagues are infatuated with Nietzsche, and judging by this book it's easy to understand why.

In places it sounds considerably poststructural (I work in a literature department). It's about complexity ('our body is, after all, only a society constructed out of many souls', section 19), determinism and power-relations. Nietzsche considers language a constituating force (20), tightly linked to experience (268).

He undertakes a typology of value systems (186), meaning to expose and to undermine them. He subordinates truth to interest and he questions the reality of oppositions: 'we can doubt whether opposites even exist' (2).

This was funny and familiar. But gradually I grew irritated, because of what seemed a continuous promotion of arrogance and rudenes. Please stop bullying supposedly 'ill' and 'degenerated' people, i thought. To make matters worse, he debunked Madame de Stael (233). I'm a fan of hers. But then my opinion swung again.

He deals with the downsides of intellectual distance (chapter 6) in an intriguing way. In chapter 8 he makes broad sweeping statements about european culture, that are, if not really convincing, still interesting. Then, in the concluding chapter, he zooms in on his favorite subject, the 'noble' person. Surprisingly this figure now loses its arrogant looks and adopts an almost tragic countenance, prone to self-destruction and loneliness (269-284). The writing here is very serious and passionate, and results in an embrace of Dionysos, 'that great ambiguity and tempter god' (295).

When writing about relation between neurosis and practices of solitude, fasting, sexual abstinence, Nietzsche writes: 'This latter doubt is justified by the fact that one of the most regular symptoms among savage as well as among civilized peoples is the most sudden and excessive sensuality, which then with equal suddenness transforms into penitential paroxysms, world-renunciation, and will-renunciation, both symptoms perhaps explainable as disguised epilepsy? But nowhere is it MORE obligatory to put aside explanations around no other type has there grown such a mass of absurdity and superstition, no other type seems to have been more interesting to men and even to philosophers - perhaps it is time to become just a little indifferent here, to learn caution, or, better still, to look AWAY, TO GO AWAY -' (pages 33-34) After reading above words, decided to go away from this book. Some of my colleagues are infatuated with Nietzsche, and judging by this book it's easy to understand why. In places it sounds considerably poststructural (I work in a literature department).

It's about complexity ('our body is, after all, only a society constructed out of many souls', section 19), determinism and power-relations. Nietzsche considers language a constituating force (20), tightly linked to experience (268). He undertakes a typology of value systems (186), meaning to expose and to undermine them. He subordinates truth to interest and he questions the reality of oppositions: 'we can doubt whether opposites even exist' (2). This was funny and familiar. But gradually I grew irritated, because of what seemed a continuous promotion of arrogance and rudenes. Please stop bullying supposedly 'ill' and 'degenerated' people, i thought.

To make matters worse, he debunked Madame de Stael (233). I'm a fan of hers. But then my opinion swung again. He deals with the downsides of intellectual distance (chapter 6) in an intriguing way. In chapter 8 he makes broad sweeping statements about european culture, that are, if not really convincing, still interesting. Then, in the concluding chapter, he zooms in on his favorite subject, the 'noble' person. Surprisingly this figure now loses its arrogant looks and adopts an almost tragic countenance, prone to self-destruction and loneliness (269-284).

The writing here is very serious and passionate, and results in an embrace of Dionysos, 'that great ambiguity and tempter god' (295). When writing about relation between neurosis and practices of solitude, fasting, sexual abstinence, Nietzsche writes: 'This latter doubt is justified by the fact that one of the most regular symptoms among savage as well as among civilized peoples is the most sudden and excessive sensuality, which then with equal suddenness transforms into penitential paroxysms, world-renunciation, and will-renunciation, both symptoms perhaps explainable as disguised epilepsy? But nowhere is it MORE obligatory to put aside explanations around no other type has there grown such a mass of absurdity and superstition, no other type seems to have been more interesting to men and even to philosophers - perhaps it is time to become just a little indifferent here, to learn caution, or, better still, to look AWAY, TO GO AWAY -' (pages 33-34) After reading above words, decided to go away from this book. Some of my colleagues are infatuated with Nietzsche, and judging by this book it's easy to understand why. In places it sounds considerably poststructural (I work in a literature department). It's about complexity ('our body is, after all, only a society constructed out of many souls', section 19), determinism and power-relations.

Nietzsche considers language a constituating force (20), tightly linked to experience (268). He undertakes a typology of value systems (186), meaning to expose and to undermine them.

He subordinates truth to interest and he questions the reality of oppositions: 'we can doubt whether opposites even exist' (2). This was funny and familiar. But gradually I grew irritated, because of what seemed a continuous promotion of arrogance and rudenes. Please stop bullying supposedly 'ill' and 'degenerated' people, i thought. To make matters worse, he debunked Madame de Stael (233). I'm a fan of hers. But then my opinion swung again.

Nietzsche Par Dela Le Bien Et Le Mal Ebook Online

He deals with the downsides of intellectual distance (chapter 6) in an intriguing way. In chapter 8 he makes broad sweeping statements about european culture, that are, if not really convincing, still interesting. Then, in the concluding chapter, he zooms in on his favorite subject, the 'noble' person. Surprisingly this figure now loses its arrogant looks and adopts an almost tragic countenance, prone to self-destruction and loneliness (269-284). The writing here is very serious and passionate, and results in an embrace of Dionysos, 'that great ambiguity and tempter god' (295). The other evening, a few pages from the end of this work, I fell asleep listening to Alan Watts lecturing on virtues.

I find it difficult to articulate the connection to Nietzsche, but what I comprehended as I awoke, while being in a state not dissimilar to that of Debussy's faun, was this rough recollection: You cannot be virtuous. If you become virtuous and you are aware of being virtuous, then you are prideful and thus no longer virtuous. Virtues are not self-conscious, and you cannot consciously be virtuous.

Nietzsche Par Dela Le Bien Et Le Mal Ebook Download

Breathing is a virtue. You don't think about it, you are not responsible for it, it happens 'un-self-consciously'. That is virtue. I understand that Alan Watts was discussing elements of Eastern philosophy, but Nietzsche mentions Eastern philosophy numerous times. Following Mortimer Adler's guidance in How to Read a Book, I now take notes in pencil in the margins of my books.

This rather short book is full of notations; Latin, French, Greek, German, and Italian words and phrases; class consciousness, waiting too long to display one's genius, 'the herd'; the Will to Power; morality; and so on. Too much to summarise here appropriately. But I read in Nietzsche a critique of mediocrity, and it provides me with an awakening to the class-based cringe that has been highlighted by my reading and study over the years. Alan Watts said something like being self-conscious won't help one to be virtuous.

Benjamin Franklin wrote that although he worked to consciously improve himself, using his 13-week virtues checklist, he was aware that he could never be perfect. If I take into account Nietzsche's critique of the herd morality and religion, and the privilege of rank and the position adopted by others in relation to my lowly class-based existence (which doesn't manifest itself in any meaningful way outside my own head), then the idea of 'beyond good and evil' makes some intuitive sense. Nonetheless, I am far from articulating Nietzsche's ideas beyond what I can grasp from a handful of his work.

I may take some solace in that Franklin couldn't be virtuous, that Adler tells me there is nothing wrong with interpreting my reading without the aid of others, that Nietzsche writes much like La Rochefoucauld, and that he thought the Stoics were wrong. This is interesting because the Stoics advocated 'living according to one's nature'. As it is so natural, then how can one 'will' oneself to live in a way that is predestined? This is one of the most helpful explanations of the deductive method!

On flicking back through my notes, two things are noticeable. First, the race elements the Nazis picked up on (thanks to Nietzsche's sister, I believe). This is no worse than Jack London, writing not that long after Nietzsche and I encountered parts that wouldn't fit with Nazism. Second, the attitude towards women. This was written before universal suffrage, but clearly, Nietzsche was no John Stuart Mill. Indeed, Nietzsche was a critic of utilitarianism.

I will finish with this quote on scholars and artists (I had heavily underlined it while reading - there is always a pencil on hand these days), one that brings together in Nietzsche's words what I felt in my 'faunish' moment while listening to Alan Watts (pp. 142-3):One finds nowadays among artists and scholars plenty of those who betray by their works that a profound longing for nobleness impels them; but this very need of nobleness is radically different from the needs of the noble soul itself, and is in fact the eloquent and dangerous sign of the lack thereof. It is not the works, but the belief which is here decisive and determines the order of rank - to employ once more an old religious formula with a new and deeper meaning - it is some fundamental certainty which a noble soul has about itself, something which is not to be sought, is not to be found, and perhaps, also, is not to be lost.The noble soul has reverence for itself.

It would seem that it is 'beyond good and evil'. (Disclaimer: I'm definitely not qualified to write this review.) When I started secondary school, in our first history classes, every so often it would be mentioned that such and such a historical figure was racist, or sexist, or what have you. For a bunch of 12 year old girls, this was pretty shocking, and I remember my teacher having to silence us and remind us: 'it's not fair to judge someone by the standards of our time'. I think there's a lot of sense in that idea, and this is what I tried to do with 'Beyond Good and Evil', but unfortunately, I found it impossible simply because Nietzsche's philosophy is deeply entrenched in 19th century European society - remove that context and what he's saying won't make sense. And so, because a lot of his philosophy is deeply rooted in social hierarchy, misogyny and nationalism (even though I wouldn't say Nietzsche is hugely nationalistic himself by 19th century standards), 'Beyond Good and Evil' can be tasteless to someone with more contemporary values. I don't doubt that Nietzsche was a genius, however. His deconstruction of Western philosophy is very impressive and he makes many valid criticisms of the likes of Descartes and Kant.

I also can see that his work is incredibly influential, and (though I'm not well versed in philosophy) I gather that it's Nietzsche's influence that led to the more post-moral slant of modern philosophy. Nietzsche brings forward a lot of excellent ideas, and is admirable in not shying away from controversy. He takes a more cynical view of human nature than (probably) was typical until that point, and this is seen in ideas such as the will to power and the notions of master and slave morality. However much or little we agree with these notions, they're daringly subversive, and I think that they've made their mark on contemporary thinking, on an everyday level as much as on a philosophical one. Master and slave morality is itself one of the ideas that seems particularly tasteless to us, in spite of it having penetrated people's thinking - we (hopefully!) don't see the world in terms of masters and slaves, or leaders and followers, or higher and lower anymore, at least not in the same way that Europe did in the 19th century. It's very unappealing to us to see the world in terms of noble versus downtrodden and victimised.

At the same time, though, some of the ideas of master morality - self-respect, self-righteousness, etc - are widely accepted these days as positive ways of living. I don't want to go on for too much longer, but I'll finish by saying that Nietzsche was a highly intelligent philosopher, and an astute observer of the world around him. I may be slightly unfair in criticising the tastelessness of his views, but I do think that his philosophy is inextricably linked with the attitudes of 19th century Europe. I did enjoy it on the whole, though, and in spite of the three-and-a-half stars, I think 'Beyond Good and Evil' is definitely a book worth reading and forming an opinion on! And I'm sorry for this mess of a review. Though it contains some thought-provoking aphorisms, when it comes to its longer, more substantive passages, Beyond Good and Evil is not what its title proclaims.

Nietzsche certainly does not move beyond the realm of value judgments altogether (which is about the best thing I can say for him in this regard). Nor does he even offer a genuine alternative to conventional conceptions of good and evil. Rather, he simply takes the flip-side of that coin and reverses the labels, ascribing (at least by strong implication) moral superiority to what would conventionally be called the 'evil' and moral inferiority to what society had generally come to accept as the 'good'. On this last, much of his criticism of Christianity, which he aptly described as 'slave-morality', is quite accurate; but in his own positive views, he unfortunately failed to move beyond the Christian moral framework and offer a genuine alternative. For example, instead of saying that the strong should sacrifice themselves to the weak, he held that the strong should sacrifice the weak to themselves. He completely accepted the view that morality was about masters and slaves, and only argued as to who should be sacrificed to whom.

He writes, for instance: 'The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should.accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, FOR ITS SAKE, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is NOT allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher EXISTENCE.' This illustrates the problem with this sort of Nietzschean pseudo-egoism very well: one cannot accept egoism except on the basis of individualism-the 'ego' is, after all, the 'I', the individual self as distinct from other selves. Nietzsche senses this and tries to uphold the individual (e.g., 'the individual dares to be individual and detach himself')-but one cannot uphold the individual while at the same time speaking of sacrificing legions of individuals. It's simply not consistent.if it is right for some people to exist for their own sake as individuals, then by the same token every other individual has that same right (Nietzsche's separation of them into 'noble' and 'despicable' classes notwithstanding). The alternative to populism is not elitism, but individualism.and elitism is by definition not individualism. As one dictionary aptly puts it, elitism is 'consciousness of or pride in belonging to a select or favored group'.it may be a smaller group, but it is still defining oneself primarily in terms of and in relation to the group.

Indeed, Nietzche writes: '.egoism belongs to the essence of a noble soul, I mean the unalterable belief that to a being such as 'we,' other beings must naturally be in subjection, and have to sacrifice themselves.' Note the 'we' where one would expect an 'I', followed by the calls for sacrifice of one group to another.clearly, Nietzsche is not a genuine individualist, but a common elitist merely posing as one. All of this follows from what might be called his metaethical principles, for example that '.life itself is ESSENTIALLY appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation.' This is of course true of animals, but not of human beings in the moral sense. You might think that Nietzsche recognizes this as he describes the egoist as a 'CREATOR OF VALUES', but he means that only in the sense that he subjectively defines values for himself, not that he actually creates the values his life requires rather than appropriating them from those who do create them. So for Nietzsche, the 'egoist' is existentially a parasite on those who are actually creative and productive.

Nietzsche does insist that the highest men are not simply those who are physically superior, but spiritually (for lack of a better word-Nietzsche uses the term 'psychically' in the translation I'm using) as well-the great individuals who shape a culture rather than merely being shaped by it, the Wagners, the, well.the Nietzsches! But given that these men are simply those who have the greatest concentration of the Will to Power, and not through any morally praiseworthy choices of their own, as Nietzsche denies freedom of the will, it's not clear that their superior status is in any sense 'deserved'. And whether their domination over others is through sheer force of will, or by actual physical domination, it still basically comes down to 'might makes right'. The 'Will to Power' is itself a sort of half-baked idea. Solomon makes a lot out of Nietzsche's rejection of Plato and Schopenhauer, and of metaphysics in general, but interpreting his 'Will to Power' as a merely psychological phenomenon (even a universal one) is a bit of a stretch, when he largely took the idea from Schopenhauer's 'Will' or 'Will to Live' and when its place in Nietzsche's philosophy is similar in form and function (if not in content) to Plato's Form of the Good. But to be fair, interpreting Nietzsche is not exactly a clear-cut undertaking, considering the unsystematic nature of his writings. Even Nietzsche's comments on peripheral subjects don't stand up very well in retrospect.

Many of his remarks about women are extremely unfortunate, and his attempt at music criticism is almost laughable as he dismisses Mendelssohn, Schumann, and the Romantics (and even Beethoven as the transition between Mozart and them) as unsubstantial and therefore short-lived and already forgotten-when his own musical compositions (yes, Nietzsche was himself something of an amateur composer!) have actually been forgotten (though they're not too bad) much more so than those. So is there any value in reading Nietzsche today? Certainly, for those interested in the history of philosophy.it is interesting, for example, how Nietzsche's emphasis on feeling or 'the passions' over rational thought bridged the gap between Hegel as well as the German Romantic philosophers such as Schelling, and the existentialists, on the one hand; and on the other how his proto-phenomenology bridged the gap between Kant and not only the existentialists but also the pragmatists. And Beyond Good and Evil does contain some beautifully expressed thoughts, including one of my all-time favorite passages: '.it is some fundamental certainty which a noble soul has about itself, something which is not to be sought, is not to be found, and perhaps, also, is not to be lost.-THE NOBLE SOUL HAS REVERENCE FOR ITSELF.' That is a beautiful, and (properly understood) profoundly true, idea. If only Nietzsche could have lived up to it in the rest of the work.